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Abstract
A central challenge of adversarial learning is to in-
terpret the resulting hardened model. In this con-
tribution, we ask how robust generalization can be
visually discerned and whether a concise view of
the interactions between a hardened decision map
and input samples is possible. We first provide a
means of visually comparing a hardened model’s
loss behavior with respect to the adversarial vari-
ants generated during training versus loss behav-
ior with respect to adversarial variants generated
from other sources. This allows us to confirm that
the association of observed flatness of a loss land-
scape with generalization that is seen with natu-
rally trained models extends to adversarially hard-
ened models and robust generalization. To comple-
ment these means of interpreting model parameter
robustness we also use self-organizing maps to pro-
vide a visual means of superimposing adversarial
and natural variants on a model’s decision space,
thus allowing the model’s global robustness to be
comprehensively examined.
1 Introduction
Neural Network (NN) models are vulnerable to adversarial
variants [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al.; Huang et
al., 2017]. An adversarial variant is a data sample generated
by making a small modification to an existing sample such
that the natural (original) and new adversarial variant are very
similar (e.g. indistinguishable to the human eye for images)
but the adversarial variant is incorrectly classified. This was
first studied in the context of image classification [Goodfel-
low et al., 2015], but has also been studied in malware detec-
tion [Grosse et al., 2017].
We are interested in how to interpret and visually assess ad-
versarially hardened NN models. One existing visualization
is loss progression, see Figure 3 [Madry et al., 2017]. Assum-
ing a saddle-point formulation, it plots the loss of a hardened
or naturally trained model given inputs that are adversarially
generated variations of a single sample over iterations of inner
maximization. Related to loss progression is loss evolution,
for example [Madry et al., 2017, Fig. 5]. It plots the de-
crease in average inner maximization loss for the maximally
adversarial variation of every sample per training step. Loss
histograms are another interpretive tool, see Figure 4 [Madry
et al., 2017]. They differentiate a model’s loss to adversarial
variants for which it was retrained from loss to other sample
sources in terms of the frequency of sample losses. Finally,
decision boundary analysis [He et al., 2018] can show how
hardening a model affects the average distance from samples
to the closest decision boundary (i.e. the point where the label
of a sample changes). Distance is calculated in terms of itera-
tions by perturbing a sample by a fixed amount each iteration
until its label changes.
In contrast to the aforementioned tools, loss landscape vi-
sualization reveals the geometry of the loss landscape around
a model’s parameters. For models trained with natural sam-
ples, flatness (sharpness) has been associated with good
(poor) generalization [Chaudhari et al., 2017; Keskar et al.,
2017]. This natural generalization is subsumed by robust
generalization. Robust generalization is required for a hard-
ened NN model because the model must handle benign and
malicious samples plus adversarial variations. In this con-
tribution we use an existing loss landscape tool by Li et al.
[2017] to visualize a loss landscape of a hardened model
given the adversarial variations with which it was trained.
Our aim is to then compare and contrast loss landscapes of
models hardened by different adversarial learning methods.
Furthermore, for each model hardened by a specific adver-
sarial learning method, we aim to compare its loss landscape
given adversarial variations derived during learning to its loss
landscape given a bigger set of adversarial variations, includ-
ing ones derived from adversarially learning another model
with a different method. This allows us to answer the general
question of whether the flatness/sharpness association holds
for robust generalization.1
In considering input space interpretation, rather than pa-
rameter interpretation, blind spot coverage, a scalar value
computed during training, has been reported for NN mod-
els that have been trained with natural and adversarially gen-
erated samples in the binary input space [Al-Dujaili et al.,
2018]. A blind spot is, informally, a region in the input space
where there is a lack of training examples. While blind spot
1Standard generalization refers to the model’s performance on
previously unseen data. In the context of robust generalization
above, we consider the model’s performance on previously unseen
data and unseen attacks.
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coverage is related to the size of the input space region that
has been extrapolated by the model’s decision map, it does
not provide decision map-sample locality information. We
aim for a way of indicating where the adversarial variations
or benign and malicious samples are located relative to the
decision boundary.
Towards this combined set of aims, this paper presents
an adversarial loss landscape method and a decision, self-
organizing map method that help interpret a hardened NN
model. We demonstrate the methods on the adversarial mal-
ware detection problem for portable executable (PE) files. We
use models adversarially trained by 4 different methods and
we assess each model given benign and malicious samples
as well as adversarial variations arising either from its own
hardening or from the hardening of the other 3 models. In
Section 2 we formalize the adversarial malware detector hard-
ening problem and describe the dataset we use. Section 3 de-
scribes the visualization tools. Finally, Section 4 outlines the
conclusions and future work.
2 Formal Background
In this section, we briefly describe the problem of hardening
machine learning malware detectors (binary classifiers) via
adversarial learning and the setup used to train them. We
adopt the notation and setup used in [Al-Dujaili et al., 2018].
Binary Executable Representation. Based on extracted
static features, each binary executable is represented by a
feature indicator vector x = [x1, . . . , xm] ∈ X . That is,
X = {0, 1}m and xj is a binary value that indicates whether
the jth feature is present or not. Labels are denoted by
y ∈ Y = {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 denote benign and malig-
nant (malicious) executables, respectively.
Adversarial Learning. An adversarial malware variation
xadv (which may or may not be misclassified) of a correctly
classified malware x can be generated by perturbing x in
a way that preserves its malicious functionality and maxi-
mizes the loss L of the binary classifier model of parameters
θ ∈ Rp, i.e.,
xadv ∈ arg max
x¯∈S(x)
L(θ, x¯, y = 1) , (1)
where S(x) ⊆ X is the set of feature indicator vectors that
preserve the functionality of malware x (see Fig. 1).
In adversarial learning, adversarial variations are incorpo-
rated into the learning process in a saddle-point formulation.
That is, we would like to find the optimal model parameters
θ∗ such that
θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∈Rp
E(x,y)∼D
[ adversarial loss︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
x¯∈S(x)
L(θ, x¯, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
natural loss
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adversarial learning
. (2)
Solving the problem in Eq. (2) involves an inner non-
concave maximization problem and an outer non-convex min-
imization problem. Al-Dujaili et al. [2018] proposed a set
[0,0,0]
[1,1,1]
[1,0,0]
[1,1,0]
[0,1,1]
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Figure 1: The 3-dimensional feature indicator vector space of
two malicious binary executables (malwares). The set of ad-
versarial variations for the malware at [1, 0, 0] is S([1, 0, 0]) =
{[1, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0], [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 1]}, and for the malware at [0, 1, 1]
is S([0, 1, 1]) = {[0, 1, 1], [1, 1, 1]}. The arrows point to the set of
allowed perturbations. Adapted from [Al-Dujaili et al., 2018].
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Figure 2: Overview of SLEIPNIR adversarial learning framework.
Malware is perturbed by an inner maximization method to create
adversarial variations. The generated adversarial variations and be-
nign samples are used in an outer minimization problem. A neural
network model is trained in batches by optimizing the adversarial
and natural loss using gradient descent. Adapted from [Al-Dujaili et
al., 2018].
of inner maximizer algorithms—namely rFGSMk, dFGSMk,
BGAk, and BCAk—and incorporated them in their SLEIPNIR
framework (see Fig. 2) to solve Eq. (2). In this context, the
inner maximizers algorithms can also be regarded as adver-
sarial (variant xadv) generation methods. The framework was
validated on a corpus of Windows portable executables as de-
scribed next.
Dataset. The dataset is composed of Portable Executable
(PE) files, a file format for executables in 32-bit and 64-bit
Windows operating systems. The PE format encapsulates in-
formation necessary for Windows OS to manage the wrapped
code, and this information can be extracted in order to con-
struct feature representations. PE files are a natural choice
due to their structure and widespread use as malware. The
dataset used for visualization consists of 34, 995 malicious
PE’s from VirusShare2 and 19, 696 benign PE’s from CNET3.
As described earlier, each PE is represented as a feature indi-
cator vector, where each entry corresponds to a unique Win-
dows API call, The value ”1” in an entry denotes the presence
of the corresponding API call. In our dataset, we observe a
total of 22, 761 unique API calls, thus each PE file is repre-
sented as a binary vector x ∈ X = {0, 1}22761. We use the
LIEF4 library to parse each PE. Note that other established
parsing tools can be used (e.g., [Carrera, 2018]) and we leave
investigating different parsers for future work. The models
were trained as described in [Al-Dujaili et al., 2018].
3 Visualizing Adversarially Hardened Models
In this section, we describe visualization tools that help elu-
cidate blind spots and the robustness of hardened models. We
demonstrate these tools on the four adversarially hardened
models described in [Al-Dujaili et al., 2018] in addition to
the naturally trained model. The models are denoted by their
inner maximizer (adversarial generation) methods: dFGSMk,
rFGSMk, BGAk, BCAk, and Natural, respectively. Based
on [Al-Dujaili et al., 2018]’s test set results, the order of
the models from the most to the least robust is as follows:
rFGSMk, BGAk, dFGSMk, BCAk, and Natural. Given this
order, we ask the following question: would visualizing the
loss landscape and the decision space based on the training
set tell us something about the model’s performance on the
test set (i.e., its robust generalization)? We first present the
loss progression and histograms of inner maxima employed
by Madry et al. [2017].
3.1 Loss Progression of Inner Maxima Methods
Loss progression plots can be used to show how well an ad-
versarial generation method solves the inner maximization
of (2). We reiterate that by inner maxima (local or global),
we mean the adversarial malware variations xadv ∈ S(x)
generated when solving the inner maximization problem of
Eq. (2). To generate a loss progression plot, we take a mal-
ware sample x and track the model loss over iterations of the
considered inner maximizer method. A low final loss value
of an inner maximizer method indicates a failure to fool the
model into thinking an adversarial variant is benign.
In the plots in Figure 3, the loss of the progressive varia-
tions of a malicious sample is shown. Each of the inner max-
imizer methods is able to inflict a high adversarial loss on the
naturally trained model (Figures 3a, 3c, 3e, 3g) but struggles
to do so (i.e. inflicts a lower loss) on its adversarially hard-
ened model (Figures 3b, 3d, 3f, 3h). Note the significantly
smaller loss (y axis) scale of the adversarially hardened mod-
els in comparison to naturally trained models.
Figures 3c and 3d demonstrate the difference in loss be-
tween a naturally-trained model tested afterward againsts
rFGSMk adversarial variations and an adversarially hardened
model trained with rFGSMk. Against the rFGSMk-trained
model, rFGSMk variations increase the loss, but not enough
to surmount the method’s rounding threshold. This resets the
2https://virusshare.com/
3https://www.cnet.com/
4https://lief.quarkslab.com/
changes back to 0 at the last training iteration. We round the
adversarial variations because our model accepts only binary
inputs.
3.2 Loss Histograms of Inner Maxima Methods
In addition to loss progression, the final loss values corre-
sponding to different starting points x′ ∈ S(x) can be ag-
gregated in a histogram. Figure 4 illustrates the loss values
for each model resulting from applying each of our adver-
sarial generation methods (dFGSMk, rFGSMk, BGAk, BCAk)
on a single malware x sample along with 200 additional
randomly sampled points in S(x). dFGSMk, rFGSMk, and
BGAk demonstrate strong resistance, with loss values very
close to 0 for all adversarial variations. BCAk on the other
hand provides resistance only against itself, not any of the
three other inner maximizers. This indicates that not all inner
maximizers provide effective robustness against other inner
maximizers, leading us to explore different techniques for vi-
sualizing this phenomenon.
The loss progression and histogram plots visualize the
model in a local way: solely in the context of a particular
data sample. We would like to examine the model in a global
sense. To this end, we visualize the model’s loss landscape
and decision map.
3.3 Loss Landscape
To compare natural and hardened models in parameter space
Rp, we visualize the loss landscape. The loss landscape refers
to the relationship between model parameters and loss values.
This relationship is difficult to visualize due to the extreme
high dimensionality of a NN model. What can be plotted,
however, is the immediate area around a particular set of pa-
rameters. The sharpness/flatness of this area is of great in-
terest due to a hypothesized correlation between sharpness of
the loss landscape and high generalization error [Chaudhari
et al., 2017; Keskar et al., 2017]. The goal of visualizing the
loss landscape is to compare the effects of adversarial train-
ing. Toward this end, we plot the loss landscape in two ways:
1. using malicious and benign samples plus only adversar-
ial variants generated with the same method used to train the
model (Figure 5a), and 2. using malicious and benign sam-
ples plus adversarial variants from all methods (Figure 5c).
Method. As described in Algorithm 1, line 3, we plot the
loss landscape of our natural and hardened models using
filter-wise normalization [Li et al., 2017]. We use an range
of -2 to 2 for α and β with a 0.25 increment. Gaussian direc-
tion matrices δ and η are generated separately for each plot.
We use 250 samples for each loss calculation: benign and
malicious samples, dFGSMk-generated, rFGSMk-generated,
BGAk-generated, and BCAk-generated variants. Additionally,
we use only benign and malicious samples from the model’s
training set for the loss calculation along with the adversarial
variants.
Results. As mentioned earlier, Figure 5a shows the land-
scape of the loss function based on a subset of the correspond-
ing training sets (denoted by model-dataset in the figure) of
(a) Model: Natural
Inner Maximizer: dFGSMk
(b) Model: dFGSMk
Inner Maximizer: dFGSMk
(c) Model: Natural
Inner Maximizer: rFGSMk
(d) Model: rFGSMk
Inner Maximizer: rFGSMk
(e) Model: Natural
Inner Maximizer: BGAk
(f) Model: BGAk
Inner Maximizer: BGAk
(g) Model: Natural
Inner Maximizer: BCAk
(h) Model: BCAk
Inner Maximizer: BCAk
Figure 3: Progressions of loss for a naturally trained model and a model trained with an adversarial generation method. Presentation of
adversarial variation derfived from the generation method. The x axis shows the number of iterations (steps) of the inner maximization.
(a) Naturally-Trained (b) dFGSMk-Trained (c) rFGSMk-Trained (d) BGAk-Trained (e) BCAk-Trained
Figure 4: Histograms of loss values from each type of adversarial generation method, blue is rFGSMk, green is dFGSMk, red is BGAk, and
light blue is BCAk. The difference in x-axis scale among naturally and adversarially trained models shows that training with inner maximizer
methods improves resistance to adversarial variants, with dFGSMk, rFGSMk, and BGAk more resistant than BGAk.
the five models, while Figure 5c shows the same based on
the union of these subsets (denoted by union-dataset in the
figure): as it was trained naturally, the loss landscape of the
Naturalmodel (top subplot of Figure 5a) is associated with
the standard generalization [Li et al., 2017], and therefore one
can not comment on the association of its flatness to robust
generalization. When the adversarial variants from all the in-
ner maximizers are incorporated in the Natural’s loss land-
scape (top subplot of Figure 5c), its chaotic structure clearly
supports that standard and robust generalization are two dif-
ferent notions [Schmidt et al., 2018].
On the other hand, we observe that the landscape’s flat-
ness and smoothness of the top most robust hardened models
(rFGSMk, BGAk, and dFGSMk) persist through their corre-
sponding subplots in both Figures 5a and 5c. Loss landscape
of the poorly hardened model with BCAk (bottom subplot of
Figure 5a) shows a small bump near model’s parameters and
it gets more chaotic when the rest of the adversarial variants
are incorporated (bottom subplot of Figure 5c).
Note that without the knowledge of other inner maximiz-
ers, one can only generate a subplot similar to those of Fig-
ure 5a based on the considered inner maximizer, and we saw
from these subplots that a bumpy geometry of loss landscape
could be an indicator of a poorly hardened model (BCAk).
However, they still do not help in ranking the rest of the hard-
ened models: rFGSMk, BGAk, and dFGSMk. With the hope
that it will convey a clearer picture, we are motivated to visu-
alize the decision map of these models, as discussed next.
3.4 Decision Map
We use Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to visualize the deci-
sion map of natural and hardened models and superimpose
samples and variants on it. This make false positives and neg-
atives easy to see. A self-organizing map is a neural network
trained using unsupervised learning to map a set of inputs to
a lower dimensional mapping [Kohonen, 1990]. For input
mapping we select either a model’s training samples plus its
adversarial variants (column 2 of Figure 5b) or training sam-
ples as well as the union of variants from each adversarial
generation method (column 4 of Figure 5b).
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Loss Landscape
Requires:
θ ∈ Rp: model parameters with θ(j) ∈ Rpj as
the jth layer’s parameters
Dbon : benign PEs dataset
Dmal : malicious PEs dataset
Dadv : adversarial malicious PEs dataset
(αmin, αmax): range of parameter α ∈ R
(βmin, βmax): range of parameter β ∈ R
// filter-wise normalization [Li et al., 2017]
1: for each layer j of the model’s layers do
2: δ(j)i , η
(j)
i ∼ N (0, 1) , ∀i ∈ [pj ]
3: Scale δi and ηi to have the same `2-norm as θ(j)
δ
(j) ← δ
(j)
||δ(j)|| ||θ
(j)|| , η(j) ← η
(j)
||η(j)|| ||θ
(j)||
4: end for
// generate loss value at each α and β location
5: for α in [αmin, . . . , αmax] do
6: for β in [βmin, . . . , βmax] do
7: for each layer j of the model’s layers do
8: θˆ(j) ← θ(j) + αδ(j) + βη(j)
9: end for
10: loss← 0
11: for each sample k inDbon ∪Dmal ∪Dadv do
12: loss+ = L(θˆ,x(k), y(k))
13: end for
14: plot avg(loss) at coordinate (α, β)
15: end for
16: end for
Method. We use the Somoclu package [Wittek et al., 2017]
for training each SOM. For all plots, the self-organizing map is
a 50 by 50 grid of neurons. We train the map for 25 epochs on
a dataset composed of 1,000 samples of each sample and vari-
ant type. After training on natural and adversarial samples for
sufficient epochs, we use the weight vectors of the neurons to
plot the model’s decision map in the lower dimensional map-
ping by feeding each to the model and color intensity coding
the network’s probabilistic belief in the input being benign.
We next pass the samples and variants through the mapping
and superimpose them on top of the implied decision map.
Algorithm 2
Decision Boundary with Self-Organizing Maps
Requires:
θ ∈ Rp: model parameters with θ(j) ∈ Rpj as
the jth layer’s parameters
Dbon : benign PEs dataset
Dmal : malicious PEs dataset
Dadv : adversarial malicious PEs dataset
m: feature vector size
// instantiate and train self-organizing map SOM
1: SOM← a 2D grid of neurons with weight vectorsw ∈ Rm
2: for each sample i inDbon ∪Dmal ∪Dadv do
3: train SOM with x(i)
4: end for
// plot the model’s decision map
5: for each neuron j in SOM do
// compute benign probability at the neuron’s vector
6: calculate p(y = 0|x = w(j), θ)
7: plot the probability value at j’s coordinates in SOM
8: end for
9: for each sample i inDbon ∪Dmal ∪Dadv do
// get the best matching neuron
10: j ← argminj′∈SOM ||x(i) −w(j
′)||
11: Mark i at j′s coordinates in SOM
12: end for
Results. In the decision boundaries shown in Figures 5b
and 5d, dark red indicates that the model has a high confi-
dence in the sample being benign. While the decision map
based on model-dataset of the Natural model (top subplot
of Figure 5b) is fairly balanced between benign and malicious
samples, the model’s vulnerability to adversarial variations is
clearly shown on its decision map based on union-dataset (top
subplot of Figure 5d): the bulk of the adversarial variations
are situated in regions that belong to the benign class with
high confidence.
Interestingly, for rFGSMk, the most robust model, the ad-
versarial variations sit relatively far from the decision bound-
ary between benign and malicious classes (middle subplot
of Figure 5b), compared to the rest of the hardened mod-
els. As we move from more to less robust models, the ad-
versarial variations get closer to the decision boundary. For
instance, one can observe that close to the decision bound-
ary: the rFGSMk model has one adversarial variation, the
BGAk model has around three adversarial variations, and
the dFGSMk model has around seven adversarial variations
neighboring the decision boundary. It gets even worse for the
poorly hardened model (BCAk), where the adversarial vari-
ations step into regions that belong to the benign class with
medium to high confidence (bottom subplot of Figure 5b).
This observation is reaffirmed in Figure 5d where BCAk’s de-
cision map is very similar to that of Natural. Furthermore,
the regions with high-confidence benign class shrink as we
move from less to more robust models and the adversarial
variations from all the inner maximizers are situated in re-
gions that belong to the malicious class with high confidence.
4 Conclusion
We provide a suite of visualization tools5 for insight into
evaluating the effectiveness of adversarial hardening with the
end goal of creating models resistant to adversarial meth-
ods. We investigated a variety of techniques that help explain
how models benefit from adversarial (saddle-point) training.
Using a dataset of PE files, we showed differences in loss
progressions and loss histograms between naturally trained
and adversarially trained models. We verified that supple-
menting model training with a single adversarial (inner max-
imizer) method provides resistance against the same method
and sometimes other methods in the form of reduced loss val-
ues for adversarial variants. We also visualize the parameter
space and input space of adversarially trained models using
filter-wise normalization and self-organizing maps, respec-
tively. We saw that the geometry of the loss landscape of a
hardened model may provide an insight about its robust gen-
eralization. Based on our experiments, it appears that deci-
sion boundary and its location relative to the adversarial vari-
ations has a stronger association with the hardened model’s
robustness, compared to the geometry of the loss landscape
around the model’s parameters. While this paper addressed
models with binary feature space, in our future work, we
would like to investigate the presented methods on models
with continuous feature space (e.g., images).
5The code will be made available upon publication
Loss Landscape (Model-Dataset) Decision boundary (Model-Dataset) Loss Landscape (Union-Dataset) Decision boundary (Union-Dataset)
B
C
A
k
B
G
A
k
r
F
G
S
M
k
d
F
G
S
M
k
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: (a) Loss landscapes for each model using only adversarial samples generated with the same inner maximizer used in training,
with no adversarial variants for the naturally trained model. (b) Decision boundaries with a custom trained SOM per model using only
malicious (#), benign (4), and vectors generated with the same adversarial (×) inner maximizer used to train the model. The color indicates
the SOM model’s benign probability belief (white=low, red=high). (c) Loss landscapes for each model trained with malicious/benign and
adversarial samples of each type. (d) Decision boundaries resulting from each type of adversarial training with all types of adversarial
vectors: dFGSMk (×), rFGSMk (?), BGAk (+), BCAk (). The self-organizing map used is the same across all plots.
Flatness in the loss landscape when only considering adversarial variants generated using the training method (Column 5c) does not
imply model robustness, e.g. the BCAktrained model in in Column 5c is flat but not robust. In Column 5c, where all adversarial methods are
considered, flatness does correlate with robustness which is also reinforced in Column 5d.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by CrowdStrike, the MIT-IBM Wat-
son AI Lab and CSAIL CyberSecurity Initiative.
References
Abdullah Al-Dujaili, Alex Huang, Erik Hemberg, and Una-
May O’Reilly. Adversarial deep learning for robust
detection of binary encoded malware. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1801.02950, 2018.
Ero Carrera. pefile: a python module to read
and work with pe (portable executable) files.
https://github.com/erocarrera/pefile, 2018.
Pratik Chaudhari, Anna Choromanska, Yann LeCun Ste-
fano Soatto, Carlo Baldassi, Christian Borgs, Jennifer
Chayes, Levent Sagun, and Riccardo Zecchina. Entropy-
sgd: Biasing gradient descent into wide valleys. ICLR,
2017.
Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy.
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. ICLR
- International Conference on Learning Representations,
2015.
K. Grosse, N. Papernot, P. Manoharan, M. Backes, and P. Mc-
Daniel. Adversarial perturbations against deep neural net-
works for malware classification. Proceedings of the 2017
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
2017.
Warren He, Bo Li, and Dawn Song. Decision boundary anal-
ysis of adversarial examples. ICLR - International Confer-
ence on Learning Representations, 2018.
Sandy Huang, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, and
Pieter Abbeel Yan Duan. Adversarial attacks on neural net-
work policies. https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.02284, 2017.
Nitish Shirish Keskar, Dheevatsa Mudigere, Jorge Nocedal,
Mikhail Smelyanskiy, and Ping Tak Peter Tang. On large-
batch training for deep learning: Generalization gap and
sharp minima. ICLR, 2017.
T. Kohonen. The self-organizing map. Proceedings of the
IEEE, 1990.
Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Ad-
versarial examples in the physical world.
Hao Li, Zheng Xu, Gavin Taylor, Christoph Studer, and Tom
Goldstein. Visualizing the loss landscape of neural nets.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09913.pdf, 2017.
Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt,
Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards deep learn-
ing models resistant to adversarial attacks. In ICML 2017
Workshop on Principled Approaches to Deep Learning,
2017.
Ludwig Schmidt, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Ku-
nal Talwar, and Aleksander Madry. Adversarially ro-
bust generalization requires more data. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.11285, 2018.
Peter Wittek, Shi Chao Gao, Ik Soo Lim, and Li Zhao. Somo-
clu: An efficient parallel library for self-organizing maps.
Journal of Statistical Software, 2017.
